RONDELI BLOG
Belarus’ exit from the Eastern Partnership and what to expect next
Nino Chanadiri, MA, Ilia State University
Soon, it will be one year since the last presidential elections in Belarus. These elections were widely believed to have been rigged in favor of President Lukashenko, and were followed by mass protests. However, the Lukashenko regime managed to remain in power. The relationship between the EU and that regime during the last year can be assessed as tense. However, it reached the hottest point in May 2021, when Minsk ordered a Ryanair flight transiting its airspace to land, and arrested dissident journalist Roman Pratasevich. The forced landing caused condemnation across the EU and in the US. The EU imposed various economic sanctions on Belarus, targeting its main export industries and access to finance, which will be more problematic for the regime than the prior attempt to blacklist Belarusian officials, which had limited impact on the behavior of the regime.
As a response to the sanctions, on June 28, the Belarusian foreign ministry announced that Minsk had recalled its Permanent Representative to the EU for consultations. Additionally, the ministry stated that Belarus was suspending its participation in the Eastern Partnership program, which was initiated in 2009 to strengthen ties between the EU and its eastern neighbors – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, assessed the decision as “another step backwards” by Belarus, and added that it will affect the people of Belarus by limiting the opportunities which the cooperation brings.
The importance of the EaP for Belarus
Even though Belarus became a part of the EaP in 2009, the level of its participation in the program was greatly dependent on the overall EU-Belarus relations, which were characterized as fluctuating with periodic deterioration. In 2010, after presidential elections followed by protests and violent crackdowns, the EU imposed sanctions, including travel bans and freezing the funds of people in charge of the Lukashenko regime. In 2015, the sanctions were eased, mainly because of peaceful presidential elections and Minsk’s role in Ukraine-Russian peace talks.
Despite the fact that human rights issues have remained a problematic topic in the bilateral relationship, the general approach of the EU was that dialogue with Minsk was better than isolation. The troubled bilateral relationship between the EU and Belarus resulted in Belarus’ participation in the program and its success being less effective in comparison with the pioneer countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, joining the EaP still brought several benefits to Belarus. One important aspect is the technical assistance provided by the EU within the program to benefit partner countries’ development and economic resilience. Despite not being a part of the Deep And Comprehensive Free Trade Area, Belarus benefited from cooperation with the EU in economic terms, including assistance for thousands of companies with funding and export support to new markets.
Additionally, in Belarus’ case, the most important role the EaP could have was to offer the possibility of help strengthening civil society. The program enables people-to-people contacts through educational and professional exchanges, as well as civil society organizations, to bring attention to important issues in EaP countries. Belarusian civil society organizations, just like the organizations from other EaP countries, had a chance to use the EaP Civil Society Forum, which strives to strengthen civil society in the region and is a good opportunity for cross-EaP contacts and initiatives.
According to the opinion survey of 2020, the majority of Belarusian people have a positive image of the EU, and more than half of Belarusians believe that relations with the EU are good. EU officials, in their statements about Belarus’ decision to leave the EaP, show solidarity to the Belarusian people and note that the EU will continue to support them.
What can change in the EaP, and what are the new chances for Georgia?
The reactions of the EaP countries, specifically from Georgia and Ukraine, were not supportive toward Belarus’ decision to leave the program. Ukraine was harsher, calling the decision “a historic mistake” by Lukashenko. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia expressed its hope that Belarus will return to the initiative. Now, with changes already happening in the program, it is interesting to discuss the possible future of the EaP. The overall developments in the region – Russia’s growing influence in the Caucasus, periodic tensions in Ukraine, and the fragility of the political situation in Georgia, clearly signify a need for the EU’s increased support to EaP countries. The EU’s readiness for involvement was expressed in the Georgian case when it brokered a deal between the government and the opposition parties which aimed to end the crisis that followed the parliamentary elections in 2020. Alongside specific issues, the deal concentrates on important reforms, an indication that the EU supports Georgia's continued rapprochement with democratic standards.
Belarus’ decision might encourage further moves by the EU toward the EaP countries that remain in the program. It has never been a secret that three of the EaP countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, have greater ambitions toward European integration, as well as progress in bilateral relations with the EU than Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to some analysts, current developments might create a need to differentiate between EaP countries in terms of progress, which can result in grouping them into different categories - those who have made better progress and those who have made less progress. This is not the first time the idea of differentiation has arisen. The fact that Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are in better positions in terms of progress has been recognized in the EU, and while discussing the future of the EaP, some note that a flexible approach is needed which will allow this group of countries to progress faster. The new situation might allow this idea to gain a momentum which will be one step forward for the three countries in deepened cooperation with the EU.
Related posts
- Hungary’s illiberal influence on Georgia’s European integration: a worrying pattern
- Expected Political Consequences of the Restoration of Railway Communication Between Russia and Georgia through Occupied Abkhazia
- The 11th package of EU sanctions and Georgia
- Russia’s New Foreign Policy Concept and the Occupied Regions of Georgia
- Lukashenko's Battle with Belarusian Identity
- Power of the people in Georgia: The EU must remain vigilant
- Flight Resumption with Russia - Potential Consequences for Georgia
- On the "Agent of Foreign Influence'' Bill and Its Disastrous Consequences for Georgia
- How the Sino-American Competition Looks from Tbilisi
- What does Russia want from Georgia?
- Geopolitics, Turkish Style, and How to React to It
- The Danger Russia’s Neighbors May Face after the Russo-Ukrainian War
- What is Belarus preparing for
- The Biden Doctrine and its Implications for Georgia
- Belarus and Russia deepen trade and economic relations with occupied Abkhazia: A prerequisite for recognition of Abkhazia's “independence”?
- A Looming Winter Energy Crisis in Europe: Can Azerbaijan Become the Continent’s Next Large Energy Supplier?
- The Russian Exclave of Kaliningrad and the Lithuanian "Sting"
- In line for the candidate status, Georgia will get a European perspective. What are we worried about?
- The break-up of the Hungarian-Polish coalition - an opportunity for the EU
- Failed Tskhinvali Referendum
- The War and Georgia
- "Autocratic Peace"
- “Rural Orbanism”- Polarization as a determinant for Hungary's political future
- Illegal Presidential Elections in the Tskhinvali Region: Why Bibilov Lost and What to Anticipate in Future
- How to Respond to Russian Ultra-Orthodox-Historic-Hegemonism?
- The War in Ukraine and the UK’s New Role in Eastern Europe
- What Will the Abolition of the OSCE Minsk Group Bring to the South Caucasus?
- The Presidential Election in France and Europe’s Political Future
- Will Pashinyan Be Able to Make a Drastic Turnaround in Armenian-Azerbaijani Relations?
- Why Has the Abkhaz Side Become More Active on Social Networks?
- Why a Neutral Ukraine Is Not on Putin’s Mind (Ukraine’s Neutral Status Is Getting Closer, but What Does It Mean to Putin?)
- Europe's energy future - challenges and opportunities
- Uncontrolled Mass Immigration and the Position of the Georgian Government
- Changes in Putin's propaganda narratives since the Russian invasion of Ukraine
- Ukraine will soon embark on a path of practical integration into the European Union. What about Georgia?
- Positions and Actions of Turkey in the Russo-Ukrainian War
- NATO’s possible expansion in Northern Europe and its significance for Georgia and Ukraine
- Political Winter Olympics in Beijing
- What Is behind Putin’s Sudden Gambit in Ukraine?
- Abkhazia in 2021: Energy Crisis, New “Minister” and Political Controversy
- L'Europe pourra-t-elle éviter le “déjà vu” ? (France, President of the Council of the European Union, and the Tensions in Eastern Europe)
- US-Russia Relations and the Issue of Ukraine
- The New Targets of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Regime
- What are the Prospects of the Eastern Partnership Summit Set on 15 December?
- The Upcoming EaP Summit - Why the Trio Initiative Should Finally Find Its Way
- What Will the Post-Merkel Era Mean for the EU’s Russia and Eastern Neighbourhood Policy?
- What Lies Behind the Growing Cooperation of the Georgian and Hungarian Governments
- “Doberman” as a Minister: Inal Ardzinba’s Prospects and Challenges
- The Belarus Crisis: How to Enhance Our Resilience Against the Russian Strategy for Its Near-Neighborhood
- Moldova’s Gas Crisis Has Been Russia’s Yet Another Political Blackmailing
- EU-Poland’s worsened relations and what it means for the EaP
- Lessons From Germany on Political Culture: What Georgia Can Learn From the German Parliamentary Elections
- Belarus One Year On: An Insecure Regime Under Russian “Protection”
- Why Did Iran-Azerbaijan Relations Become Strained?
- Russia’s Parliamentary Elections - What Can Be Said About the Regime’s Stability
- An Emerging Foreign Policy Trend in Central and Eastern Europe: A Turn from China to Taiwan?
- Vaccination: “To Be, or not to Be”…
- Can Georgia use China to balance Russia?
- Sharia Patrols in Kabardino-Balkaria: A Growing Trend or a Local Conflict?
- Pacta Sunt Servanda: Agreements must be kept
- Associated Trio, What is Next?
- Formation of a New “Political Elite” in Abkhazia - Who Will Replace the Old “Elite?”
- The symbolism of the EU flag and why a true Christian would not tear it down and burn it
- Securitization of the Arctic: A Looming Threat of Melting Ice
- What Should Georgia Expect from the NATO Summit
- The Issue of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region in the Context of NATO and European Union Membership
- (Re)Mapping the EU’s Relations with Russia: Time for Change?
- USA, Liberal International Order, Challenges of 2021, and Georgia
- Georgia's transit opportunities, novelties and challenges against the backdrop of the pandemic
- ‘Vaccine Diplomacy’: A New Opportunity for Global Authoritarian Influence?
- Deal with the ‘Dragon’: What Can Be the Repercussions of the China-EU Investment Agreement?
- Georgia’s Application for European Union Membership
- A New Dawn for Transatlantic Relations under Biden’s Presidency: What Are the Hopes for Georgia?
- Who did the judge sentence: Navalny, Putin or Russia?
- Biden’s Conundrum
- 2020 Developments in Abkhazia: “Elections,” the Pandemic and Deeper Integration with Russia
- The Hungarian Crisis: Is the EU Failing against Authoritarianism?
- Could Belarus Become a Prelude to the Great Polish-Swedish War 400 Years Ago?
- COVID 19 Pandemic Economic Crisis and Reducing the Instability of Georgia’s National Currency
- Escalation of the Karabakh Conflict: Threats and Challenges for Georgia
- Protests in Belarus, Lukashenko and the Russian Federation
- Some Thoughts on the Use of the Term „Post-Soviet Space“
- Georgia’s European Way During the Period of Pandemic Deglobalization
- Turkey's Caucasus Policy Against the Backdrop of the Latest Armenia-Azerbaijan Tensions
- Khabarovsk Krai Protests as an Indicator of the Russian Federation’s Stability
- The Pragmatism and Idealism of the Georgian-American Partnership
- Independence of Georgia and the Historic Responsibility of Our Generation
- Complications Caused by the Coronavirus in Turkey and Their Influence on Georgia
- “Elections” in Abkhazia: New “President’s” Revanche and Challenges
- Consumer Crisis in the Tskhinvali Region: Food for Thought
- Georgians Fighting the Same Battle 99 Years Later
- Georgian Defense – Political Paradox and the Vicious Circle of Not Having a System
- Why It Matters: Georgia’s 'Troll Scandal' Explained
- Political Crisis in Occupied Abkhazia
- What is the Significance of Killing General Qasem Soleimani?
- What Will the New Dialogue Format with Russia Bring for Georgia?
- On the “Russian Culture Center” in Georgia
- Whither Economic Policy?
- Main Messages of Russian Propaganda
- Massive Cyberattacks On Georgia Calls For Defense And Resilience
- What do we know about the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation and Georgia?
- What is the Connection between NATO and Reclaiming Abkhazia?
- New Focuses of the Anti-Occupation Policy
- Georgia's Problems are not Addressed at G7 Meetings: Who is to Blame?
- Vladimir Putin’s Main Messages in his Interview with the Financial Times
- Dugin has Come Out as a Supporter of Georgia – How Did This Happen?
- The Outcome of the European Parliament Elections - What Does it Mean for Georgia?
- Ten Years Since the Establishment of the Eastern Partnership
- Deterring Russia
- Why Local Elections of March 31, 2019 in Turkey are Important?
- Does the Principle of Strategic Partnership Work in Ukraine-Georgia Relations?
- A New Chance for Circular Labor Migration between Georgia and the EU
- Georgia’s Trade with Electricity: The Influence of Bitcoin
- Georgia’s External Trade: How to Strengthen Positive Trends
- The Risk of the Renewal of the Karabakh Conflict after the Velvet Revolution in Armenia
- Why It Is Necessary to Know the Day the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 Started
- Georgia’s Position in the Westernization Index 2018
- Why Did the Results of the G7 Summit in Charlevoix not Meet Our Expectations?
- The Ben Hodges Model – a Real Way for Georgia’s Membership in NATO
- Why did the Foreign Ministers of G7 not remember Georgia during their 23 April 2018 Toronto Meeting?
- Georgia and the American Strategy
- Putin’s Pre-Election Economic Promises: Myth and Reality
- Trade of Electricity: Successes of 2016, Reality of 2017 and Future Prospects– the Impact of Bitcoin (Part Two)
- Let Geneva Stay the Way it is
- Trade of Electricity: Successes of 2016, Reality of 2017 and Future Prospects – the Impact of Bitcoin (Part One)
- Geopolitical Vision of the Russian Opposition
- Dangers Originating from Russia and Georgia’s Security System
- Eurasian Custom Union and problems of Russian – Georgian FTA
- What Awaits the People of Gali?
- Disrupt and Distract: Russia’s Methodology of Dealing with the West
- Trojan Horse Model IL- 76 or Why Would Russia Want to Fight Georgia’s Forest Fires
- Russian Diplomats in Georgia – who are they, how many of them are there and what are they up to
- Putin’s Visit to the Occupied Abkhazia: Was our Reaction Actually Adequate?
- Pence’s Visit to Georgia: Several Lessons and What We Should be Expecting
- Is it Acceptable for Georgia to Declare Neutrality?
- Georgia’s European Perspective in the Context of EU’s Future Evolution
- Brexit Negotiations between the European Union and the United Kingdom have been re-launched: What will be their Influence on Georgia?
- How to Stop the “Creeping Occupation”
- Kremlin’s Policy in the Occupied Regions of Georgia Moves to a New Stage
- Syrian Civil War in the Context of Regional Security
- The Winnable Second Round of Russia’s Neighbors’ Struggle against Its Imperialism
- Turkey’s Domestic and Foreign Policy in the Context of Regional Security
- Post-Soviet States – Struggle for the Legitimation of Power
- Current Foreign Policy of Georgia: How Effective is it in Dealing with the Existing Challenges?
- Military Resilience - a Needed Factor for NATO-Partners
- Observations on the Agreement Reached with Gazprom
- New Russian Weaponry in the Caucasus and Its Impact on Georgia’s NATO Aspiration