https://www.gfsis.org.ge/ Georgian Foundation For Strategic and International Studies - events. https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1610 დასახელება: პროექტის ასისტენტი სამუშაო განაკვეთი: სრული ადგილმდებარეობა: ქ. თბილისი ძირითადი მოთხოვნები: უმაღლესი განათლება სოციალური/პოლიტიკის მეცნიერების მიმართულებით (მაგისტრის ხარისხი); ქართული და ინგლისური ენების სრულფასოვანი ცოდნა; აკადემიურად წერის უნარი; საოფისე კომპიუტერული პროგრამების ცოდნა; პროექტის ასისტენტის, კოორდინატორის ან მენეჯერის პოზიციაზე მუშაობის მინიმუმ 1-წლიანი გამოცდილება მზაობა რეგიონებში სამივლინებოდ; ორგანიზაციული უნარ-ჩვევები და პასუხისმგებლობის მაღალი გრძნობა. ძირითადი მოვალეობები: პროექტის განხორციელებასთან დაკავშირებული ადმინისტრაციული საქმიანობის წარმოება; პროექტის ფარგლებში რეგიონებში დაგეგმილი ვიზიტების ადგილზე კოორდინირება; პროექტის მიზნებიდან და საჭიროებებიდან გამომდინარე სხვადასხვა სახის ინფორმაციის მოძიება და ანალიზი; პროექტით გათვალისწინებული ღონისძიებების ადმინისტრაციული და ტექნიკური მხარდაჭრა; პერიოდული ანგარიშების მომზადების პროცესში მონაწილეობა; დაინტერესებულმა პირებმა უნდა გამოაგზავნონ რეზიუმე (CV) და სამოტივაციო წერილი შემდეგ მისამართზე: [email protected]; აუცილებელია, პოზიციის დასახელება - ,,პროექტის ასისტენტი" მიუთითოთ ელ.ფოსტის სათაურის (Subject) ველში. *გთხოვთ, გაითვალისწინოთ, რომ მაღალი ინტერესის გამო საბუთების მიღების ინდივიდუალურად დადასტურება ვერ მოხდება. დოკუმენტაციის განხილვის შემდეგ, შერჩეულ აპლიკანტებთან ჩატარდება გასაუბრება. საბუთების გამოგზავნის ბოლო ვადაა: 2023 წლის 15 სექტემბერი, 18:00. Tue, 29 Aug 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1609 Author: Volodymyr Posviatenko, Jagiellonian University in Kraków and the University of Padova Since 2010, Hungary ruled by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz party, has steadily displayed illiberal and authoritarian tendencies. Hungary’s democratic backsliding has undermined fundamental European values and damaged its international reputation. Hungary’s illiberal turn spills over further than the domestic level, though, hindering the EU’s decision-making process and adversely influencing the EU foreign policy and its substantial component – the EU enlargement policy. Hungary has always been a staunch proponent of EU enlargement. However, with the illiberal turn came changes to Hungary’s traditionally positive influence on this process, turning the country into an unwanted advocate for EU-aspiring countries. Traditionally, Hungary’s long-term priority in the EU enlargement has been the Western Balkans’ European integration. However, of late, Hungary has increased its involvement in Georgia. Considering the recent adverse dynamics of Hungary’s involvement in the EU enlargement process, the question arises: what threats might Hungary’s growing cooperation with Georgia pose to its European integration? Hungary’s newfound approach to EU Enlargement Hungary’s newfound approach to EU aspirant countries is based on engaging explicitly with selected political parties displaying characteristics compatible with his illiberal ideology, even if such cooperation is done at the expense of the security, stability and progress of European integration of these states. Orbán’s possible intention is to expand his leverage within the EU by creating a coalition of illiberal undemocratic states to challenge the influence of dominant Western EU Member States and the whole system of liberal values. Crucially, one of the pillars of Orbán’s approach is the "traditional values" sentiment, instrumentalised to promote his illiberal vision within the aspirant states by stirring up Eurosceptic and antidemocratic sentiments. Orbán’s approach undermines the EU enlargement policy as an effective foreign policy tool for the democratisation of European countries. Orbán’s actions and consequent impunity send a message to illiberal politicians that once their countries join the EU, they can exploit the economic benefits of being in the bloc while ignoring political alignment and European values. As a result, Hungary’s engagement in the domestic politics of the aspirant countries hinders the stated objective of their rapid EU accession, further dividing the opinions of EU Member States about enlargement. Examples from the Western Balkans Hungary’s current approach can be best exemplified by its engagement in the Western Balkans. Analysing Orbán’s influence in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina can help us to understand the potential consequences of Hungary’s involvement in Georgia. Viktor Orban’s key illiberal ally in the Western Balkans is Serbia. In Serbia, Orbán firmly supports the current government led by President Aleksandar Vučić, who displays similar authoritarian, populist, and illiberal traits. In June 2021, Orbán included the immediate accession of Serbia into the EU as one of seven steps of his proposed vision to reform the EU. While Serbian accession to the EU is Hungary’s long-term goal, it is illiberal Serbia that the current Hungarian government wants to join the EU immediately. The accession of such a state is undesirable for the EU. Thus, considering Hungary’s current reputation, Orbán’s strong pro-Serbian lobbyism hampers Serbia’s European integration. In North Macedonia, the Hungarian Prime Minister supports the largest opposition party, VMRO-DPMNE, which often acted undemocratically while being in power from 2006 to 2017. Its former leader, Nikola Gruevski, was granted political asylum in Hungary, despite being convicted of corruption in his home country. Since 2017, North Macedonia has seen a rapid expansion of Hungarian influence on media. Media outlets acquired by Hungarian businessmen have engaged in increased influencing of North Macedonian public opinion by undisguisedly supporting VMRO-DPMNE and spreading Eurosceptic and anti-liberal narratives. Orbán’s further divisive actions have included calls to block North Macedonia’s name compromise with Greece, which was a condition for Greece to lift its veto on North Macedonia’s EU and NATO integration. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Orbán’s closest ally is Milorad Dodik, the current President of Republika Srpska. Dodik has spent years championing a secession of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungary’s open support of Dodik’s secessionist regime directly assists his attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Orbán’s influence over Dodik offers him leverage inside the EU by projecting himself as a key player for regional stability. Therefore, Orbán’s policy jeopardises the common security efforts of the EU and NATO in the country, which puts the whole security architecture in the Western Balkans at risk and can cause further adverse consequences for wider European security. Georgia – a new target? In recent years, Hungary’s illiberal influence has spread into Georgia. This is reflected in the growing cooperation between Orbán’s government and Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, which displays ideological compatibility with Orbán’s Fidesz. The most noticeable examples of this are the insistent promotion of Christian-conservative "traditional" values, an anti-LGBTQ+ stance, Euroscepticism, and an ambiguous or even positive opinion on cooperation with Russia. In resemblance to Hungary’s illiberal turn, the Georgian government tries to curtail its citizens’ civil liberties, consolidate control over the judiciary, impede democratic electoral processes, and restrict media and academic freedoms. Thus, it is not coincidental that Georgia’s cooperation with Hungary started to increase in correlation with the intensification of its democratic backsliding. The GD government eagerly embraces growing illiberal ties with Hungary. This dynamic became especially noticeable during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. A crucial development in this regard occurred on 27 October 2022, when Prime Minister Gharibashvili visited Hungary, where he and his Hungarian counterpart signed a declaration on strategic partnership between the two states. In his remarks during the visit, Gharibashvili praised Orbán’s rule and openly stated that, for Georgia, Hungary serves as an example of the successful democratic reforms, which it wants to emulate. One more similarity between Orbán’s and GD’s governments is their attitude to Ukraine and Russia during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. During his October 2022 visit, Gharibashvili claimed that both Georgia and Hungary are doing their utmost to support Ukraine, simultaneously defending their countries’ national interests first. The similarity of both states’ positions is reflected in their calls "to end the war as soon as possible" by imposing an immediate ceasefire and halting military assistance to Ukraine. Additionally, both the Hungarian and Georgian governments have made comments accusing the Ukrainian government of being hostile to them. At the same time, Georgia’s economic ties with Russia are growing, with imports increasing by 79% in 2022, and direct flights between the states being restored, while Hungary continues to import Russian gas and crude oil, cooperate in the nuclear energy sphere, and make reciprocal diplomatic visits. Another defining visit of Prime Minister Gharibashvili to Hungary occurred on 4 May 2023, when he visited the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in Budapest. At the conference, the Georgian Prime Minister once again praised "Orbán’s leadership" and made several remarks indicating a growing tide to illiberalism, increasing Euroscepticism, and anti-Western rhetoric. The visit became representative of the GD government’s insistent promotion of "traditional values" and demonstrated that the illiberal course of the GD is firm. As a result of Gharibashvili’s participation in the CPAC, the Party of European Socialists expelled the GD from its ranks. In 2023, Hungary actively engaged in the promotion of granting the EU candidate status to Georgia. However, it is highly dubious that Hungary’s support of this matter is fully sincere. According to Rikard Jozwiak, Hungary may block Ukraine from opening its EU accession negotiation, unless the EU gives Georgia candidate status, which amounts to using Georgia as a bargaining chip to blackmail the EU and increase Hungary’s leverage over the decision-making process. Moreover, the promotion of illiberal Georgia’s accelerated accession process correlates with Orbán’s goal of creating a group of illiberal states within the EU. These actions compromise Georgia’s already deteriorating reputation and strain its prospects of receiving candidate status. Potential risks of Hungary’s involvement Hungary’s lobbyism of Georgia receiving candidate status regardless of its progress in the implementation of the European Commission’s 12 priorities might have a negative effect. The sincerity of Orbán’s support of EU enlargement based on the Copenhagen criteria is undermined by the instrumentalisation of Georgia’s status issue to increase his leverage over the EU’s decision-making process. The GD’s choice of Hungary as the role model looks like a further attempt to sabotage Georgia’s European integration process, undermine its democratic foundations, and oppose European values. Considering Hungary’s current reputation among EU Member States and its divisive activities in the Western Balkans, Georgia’s growing cooperation with Hungary might antagonise Brussels and individual EU Member States in their opinions on Georgia’s European integration. Emulating the Hungarian "success" hinders Georgia’s European perspective, as European leaders may be wary of inviting "another Hungary" to the bloc. Nevertheless, even if Orbán’s tactic succeeds in providing Georgia with candidate status, a further European integration path is not guaranteed. In this regard, Georgia’s cooperation with Orbán’s Hungary might bring precarious long-term effects, adversely affecting Georgia’s democratisation process and, consequently, its European path. Fri, 11 Aug 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1608 English version will be added soon Wed, 26 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1607 Various activities are being continuously organized by young people living in the regions of Georgia within the framework of the small grants project. This time, the Pankisi-based "Illuminator" center held a working meeting in the Akhmeta Municipality City Hall with the head of the Culture Education, Sports, and Youth Affairs Department. Pankisi youth had the opportunity to talk with the local government about their plans, challenges, and different opportunities in the community. During the meeting a future collaboration was planned with Akhmeta Municipality within the framework of the youth project "Civil Activism for the Development of Pankisi Youth". The goal of cooperation will be to increase the involvement of young people in self-government activities and to support activism. The Rondeli Foundation implements the Small Grants Project "Strengthening Regional Activism for Sustainable Change" with the financial support of the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Tue, 25 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1606 Manelle Lepoix Sciences Po Strasbourg and the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. The long-awaited debates surrounding Ukraine's potential membership in NATO were held on July 11-12 in Vilnius, Lithuania. A year and a half after Russia launched the war against Ukraine, the NATO allies met at a historical summit. The event was eagerly awaited, particularly by countries hoping to see Ukraine join NATO. France's position seems to have been noticed, particularly for its divergence from certain NATO leader countries, among them the United States and Germany. This blog aims to identify the French position at the Vilnius Summit concerning the integration of Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, and the reasons for this U-turn. A brief overview of the French positions in NATO France’s relations with its NATO allies have sometimes been stormy, and the Gaullist tradition seems to have lasted at least until Nicolas Sarkozy's term in office. Charles de Gaulle was the first to distance himself from NATO, leaving the integrated NATO command in 1966. To maintain total independence in the use of its nuclear forces, De Gaulle opted for a strong and independent France. Relations between the United Kingdom and the United States were seen as too close, to the detriment of France. De Gaulle considered that the role of the United States was far too strong to guarantee French independence. Since then, there has been talk of France's "anti-American" tradition, expressed mainly through its position in NATO. Furthermore, France has always been cautious about NATO’s eastward enlargement. Jacques Chirac criticized the idea of NATO's expansion towards Georgia and Ukraine, fearing a deterioration of relations with Russia. Continuing in the same vein, Sarkozy also refused to allow the two countries to join NATO in 2008. We can highlight several explanations regarding this position. First, the alleged almost historical closeness between the Russian and French elites in the 19th century seemed to justify an indestructible partnership despite Russia’s aggressive behavior. Second, Russia remains an undeniable power, arguably explaining the continuation of French appeasement towards Moscow. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron welcomed Vladimir Putin to Versailles, a welcome that was roundly criticized. To abandon any prospect of Ukraine joining NATO or the European Union, President Macron even spoke of a "Finlandization of Ukraine", announcing the content of France's position concerning the enlargement process. The Russia-Ukraine war is now raging, and it seems Macron wants to become the "savior of the East", unlike his German counterpart. The French position on Ukraine’s accession at the NATO Vilnius Summit In his speech in Bratislava, President Macron set the tone a month before the Vilnius Summit. Macron closed the Globsec 2023 Bratislava Forum, a first for a French President. In his speech, he focused on Russia’s war in Ukraine and collective security in Europe. In his view, the guarantees offered in the past to Ukraine and Georgia were "far too weak". He expressed his wish for Sweden to join, further demonstrating his position on the potential enlargement of NATO, directly attempting to dismantle Russian ambitions. He also announced that he was prepared to give "tangible" guarantees to Ukraine at the Vilnius Summit. His positions were clear: France would support Ukraine's membership in NATO, to secure Europe and guarantee Ukraine's territorial integrity. He went on to say that Ukraine must be helped in "every way possible" to achieve lasting peace. Quoting Henry Kissinger, he also stated that Ukraine's accession to the EU is equally necessary. Moreover, it is interesting to draw a parallel between US President Joe Biden's statement in Vilnius and Macron's in Bratislava. Biden said that Ukraine was not yet "ready" to join NATO. In Bratislava, Macron spoke of two mistakes that should not be made when it comes to Ukraine's integration into the EU: closing our eyes and playing for time, or enlarging too quickly, without planning for the future (a direct reference to obtaining the Candidate Status, which does not imply that Ukraine is directly a member of the European Union). Macron demonstrated that he was capable of saying when we need to take our time, even in a crisis. However, he did not raise this argument with regard to NATO. He expressed his belief that Ukraine could become a full-fledged member of NATO. Finally, Macron declared that he wanted to "define a path to make Ukraine's membership in NATO a reality", changing his position completely between December and June. Macron and his administration have clearly expressed this wish. Shortly before the Vilnius Summit - on July 5 - French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna, in a message of congratulations to NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, also mentioned the desire for "long-term" support for Ukraine in order to adapt the Alliance to the new security context. The French arguments for Ukraine's accession to NATO can be summed up in three parts: First, Ukraine's membership in NATO means that ensuring its security is no longer uncertain. At present, ensuring its security depends mainly on the delivery of weapons (Macron announced just before the Summit that long-range missiles would be delivered to Ukraine, reversing his previous strategy of not giving Kyiv weapons that could reach Russian territory). But the delivery of weapons remains uncertain: for how long, and how much? Second, Ukraine's membership in NATO would stabilize and institutionalize aid, also in the interests of France, where more and more civil voices are being raised against spending on Ukraine. Lassitude and anger at the political situation in France could have led Macron to favor institutionalization. Third, France has an ambition to get Putin to sit at the negotiating table. Indeed, Macron believes that if Ukraine joins NATO, Putin will have to negotiate, putting an end to the war and bringing peace to Europe. The French position on Georgia's accession at the NATO Vilnius Summit The Vilnius Summit focused primarily on the fate of Ukraine, yet Macron’s earlier Bratislava speech also revealed the French stance on Georgia’s NATO integration. As in Ukraine’s case, Macron recognized that Georgia is also subject to Russian "vindictiveness". In June 2023, Macron noted that Georgia had also not received any solid guarantees. However, no official statement was made regarding Georgia. Only arguments given in favor of Ukraine's accession could hint at the French position on Georgia. In Macron's view, Ukraine should become a member of the Alliance, not least because the war is underway. Georgia is not directly facing Russian attacks at the moment - although Russia occupies 20% of its territory. Compared with 2008, Georgia seems to have a better chance under Macron, who presents himself as open to enlargement. Nevertheless, one of Macron's arguments is to stop the war, in which he is participating - indirectly - by sending arms. He likely considers that Ukraine is the priority and that the situation in Georgia could be improved through the Ukraine-Russia negotiations. Integrating Georgia into NATO does not seem to be on Macron's immediate agenda, since the arguments put forward for Ukraine do not fit the Georgian situation. Conclusion France has modeled its position on NATO’s enlargement towards Ukraine and Georgia on those of the Baltic States and Poland. France’s stance (unlike that of Germany) has changed significantly as compared to 2008. Macron is refocusing his strategy on Ukraine. Even though Ukraine only obtained promises for its future membership and no immediate guarantees at the NATO Vilnius Summit, the French U-turn in policy is noteworthy. In light of the Bratislava speech, we can guess Macron's strategy for the European Union too, with France set to become a major ally of Eastern Europe, Europe's new gravitational point. Mon, 24 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1605 On July 18, 2023, Rondeli Foundation hosted a discussion - "Expected political consequences of the restoration of railway traffic between Russia and Georgia through occupied Abkhazia" The recent statements made by the Russian authorities on the prospect of reestablishing railway traffic between Russia and Georgia through the occupied territory of Abkhazia, despite the refusal of the Georgian government to hold negotiations on this issue, raise questions as to why this topic has become relevant for Russia again. The discussion covered different matters, among them - who will benefit and what dangers this project implementation contains for Georgia, how this issue is related, on the one hand, to the Russia-Ukraine war and to the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, and, on the other hand, to the political situation in Georgia and the 2024 parliamentary elections. Rondeli Foundation fellows, Alex Petriashvili, Mamuka Komakhia and Giorgi Badridze took part in the discussion. Thu, 20 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1604 Author: Alex Petriashvili, Senior Fellow at Rondeli Foundation The NATO summit held in Vilnius on July 11-12 drew great interest and much anticipation in the lead up to the event. Everyone understood that the topic of Ukraine would be at the epicenter of the talks, and possible specific solutions, discussions of the various developments, and predictions on the potential results only served to increase the importance of the Vilnius summit. While the position of the President of Ukraine and his administration was clearly outlined: "We understand that now there is a war and no one will accept Ukraine in NATO, but we need clear signals, a road map, and an approximate time frame regarding the invitation and membership," alliance members chose to stick to their decision on multi-year military aid, refraining from making any commitment to Ukraine’s accession or to offer an invitation. Backstage, various countries were named as being opposed to any specific promise for Ukraine, and while it was not officially stated, the United States of America and Germany were at the top of the list of suspects. Using the method of exclusion, it can be assumed that precisely these two countries prevented the reaching of a consensus, since 23 NATO member states signed a joint bilateral declaration with Ukraine supporting Ukraine's accession to NATO, and 2-3 days before the summit, during President Zelensky's visit to Ankara, President Erdoğan said that Ukraine deserves NATO membership. Among the remaining 7 members were the USA and Germany. Besides the issues of invitation and membership, there were differences of opinion and intensive diplomatic work regarding other matters also. In particular, one of the compromising offers for Ukraine was so-called Israeli-type multi-year military assistance in exchange for an absence of invitation to NATO. In this regard, the Ukrainian authorities very clearly stated that no other type of security guarantee would be acceptable to them than Ukraine's membership in NATO. I think many factors supported their argument in this regard. In addition, the question of removing the membership action plan or "MAP" obligation for Ukraine's accession was also discussed, which would have shortened the path to joining NATO. There was no consensus among the members of the alliance on this issue either. For example, Great Britain was in favor and the United States of America was against - both British Foreign Secretary James Cleverley and American President Joseph Biden openly stated their positions. Thus, as anticipated, the discussion and decision-making around the issue of Ukraine turned out to be the most dramatic. The first information spread was via Dmytro Kuleba's tweet, according to which, after long consultations, the alliance agreed that Ukraine would join NATO without the MAP. The NATO Secretary General's statement ("we are continuing to talk about this") was not as clear, which made it obvious that the issue was not fully resolved. However, due to the fact that there was no consensus on the time frame for Ukraine's invitation to NATO, all members of the alliance, including the United States, agreed to remove the MAP. This decision was recorded in the final communiqué and in the statements made by the NATO Secretary General and the President of the USA during press conferences. Apparently, the leadership of Ukraine was not satisfied and wanted specifics regarding the timing of the invitation. President Zelensky's statement before arriving at the summit was rather rigid, so much so that reciprocal statements were made and caused quite uncomfortable tension at the summit. Leaders of the member states (e.g. President Macron) and individual representatives (White House Strategic Communications Coordinator John Kirby) sympathized with Ukraine's discontent, while others (UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace) demanded more gratitude for military aid. However, in the end, Zelensky himself defused the situation, saying that a concrete response on the invitation would be ideal, but the decisions made at the summit should be considered a good result, and he is grateful for the assistance that the alliance provides to Ukraine. In addition to the removal of the MAP commitment, Ukraine adopted the format of the NATO-Ukraine Council, to which NATO itself attaches great importance. During and after the summit of the first such format, many promising statements were made for Ukraine, and after the meeting with President Biden, Zelensky should not have been dissatisfied, since the American president openly stated his strong will and readiness on Ukraine’s accession to NATO. "We eagerly await our official meeting where we will confirm the invitation to NATO." During the summit, it was decided that NATO will allocate 500 million dollars annually for non-lethal support to Ukraine, which involves training the Ukrainian armed forces to bring them in line with NATO standards. Further, the leaders of both member and non-member countries (Australia) have applied for new military aid packages for Ukraine. In particular, Germany will additionally transfer two Patriot anti-aircraft defense systems, 40 Marder armored vehicles and 25 Leopard 1 A5 tanks (bringing the total German aid so far to 700 million dollars); France will transfer long-range (400 km) SCALP-type missiles (similar to the British Storm Shadow); Canada 410 million dollars in aid; Great Britain 65 million dollars, and 30 Bushmaster armored vehicles from Australia. During the summit with the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, the heads of the defense agencies of 11 NATO member states signed the agreement to start the training of Ukrainian pilots on American F-16s from August. Later, US President's National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said that these planes are likely to be delivered to Ukraine from the stocks of European allies, and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba suggested that the US F-16s will appear in Ukraine's arsenal by the end of the 1st quarter of 2024. The crown of this assistance and support was the joint declaration agreed by the G7 countries, which contains the commitment of the seven countries with the most powerful economies of the democratic world to provide Ukraine with all the necessary weapons, help to train its armed forces, and cooperation in the field of intelligence information exchange and cyber security. It must be noted that in the final communiqué, declaration of the G7, and in the statements of individual leaders, the special importance of Ukraine's fight against corruption and the successful implementation of reforms in the institutions of state was clearly noted. The President of Ukraine highly appraised the decision of the G7, and expressed hope that it will be the basis for the signing of future bilateral security guarantee agreements. Thus, for Ukraine as a whole, the Vilnius summit should be considered a success. In addition to the Ukraine issue, there were two big topics on which reaching an agreement was of particular importance for the alliance. It is difficult to say which was more important, but in the media space, more attention was definitely paid to obtaining Turkey's agreement on Sweden's NATO membership, and Turkish President Erdoğan personally made a big contribution to this- very skillfully "upping" the game both before and during the summit in order to make his consent even more important and, to put it bluntly, get more in return. The second issue, which was also of great importance, was the decision to develop a strategic plan for defense and deterrence. At the NATO Wales summit in 2014, it was decided that within 10 years, all member countries should fulfill the obligation to spend 2% of their GDP on defense. The start of full-scale Russian aggression in Ukraine, the struggle in Ukraine, and the course of the war made it clear to all countries that most were not ready for defense and deterrence. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War emboldened the NATO member states and made them lose focus in this direction. Spending on defense and armaments has been steadily decreasing over the years. That is why, when the Alliance made the principle decision to extend military support to Ukraine, the Allies quickly discovered that their stockpiles of weapons and ammunition would soon be in danger of depletion. Accordingly, the defense and deterrence strategy required a principled decision on the part of the alliance members. We can already safely declare that the summit was successful in this regard. One day before the official opening, the Secretary General of NATO, the President of Turkey, and the Prime Minister of Sweden met in Vilnius and, after three hours of negotiations, they announced that the President of Turkey will send the ratification certificate to the Turkish legislative body as soon as possible and will personally oversee the successful and quick completion of the process. There was an expectation that the ratification procedure would be passed in the following days of the summit, however, after the summit, President Erdoğan said that the Turkish Parliament would not meet until October and, therefore, the ratification would not take place until then. We must not forget that the Hungarian Parliament must also ratify this document, and it also plans to do so in the autumn session. All in all, the issue is resolved and Sweden will become the 32nd member of NATO in the autumn. Without exaggeration, it can be said that Sweden, with the level of its military training and compatibility with NATO, the strength of its military-industrial complex, its economic situation and degree of democracy, is a great addition for a North Atlantic Alliance facing such global challenges. It has not been officially confirmed, and both sides deny a direct link, but it is said that in exchange for agreeing to Sweden's accession, Turkey will receive American approval for the purchase of new F-16 aircraft and the modernization of existing ones. The process has been moving through Congress and is highly likely to be resolved positively. The agreement reached at the summit regarding the general plan of defense and deterrence was assessed as historic, since an agreement on defense measures of such a scale was made for the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union (300,000 military personnel on high alert, additional naval and air assets, etc.), while the minimum limit of 2% of GDP on defense was decided on the "merit" of Russia's full-scale aggression in Ukraine; otherwise it would not have happened. Another issue, one which was supposed to be decided at the Vilnius summit, could not be agreed upon shortly before the summit: the election of the new Secretary General. Among the three main candidates being considered were the Prime Ministers of Denmark and Spain, and the UK Defense Secretary. Consensus could not be reached, yet the issue was easily resolved: Jens Stoltenberg's tenure as NATO Secretary General was extended for another year. Before the start of the summit, there were also reports that Joe Biden supported the candidacy of Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, although Mrs. von der Leyen herself refused the proposal. She still has one year left on her current position and, therefore, time to think about her candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary General. As for Georgia, in the paragraph dedicated to Georgia in the final communique, the adherence to the decision taken at the 2008 Bucharest summit on Georgia's accession to NATO was recorded, and in the context of the accession, the granting of a MAP to Georgia was again reiterated as a necessary condition. Noteworthy is the reference to the importance of reform implementation, in particular, the importance of using all instruments of cooperation with NATO in terms of implementing said reforms. In my view, if the political will had been there, doing the necessary work well in advance of the summit and making progress on reforms would have given us a better record in the final NATO communique. In my opinion, overall, the summit was a success. I think that the expectations were somewhat exaggerated, but the results turned out to be significant and tangible. Next year, the 75th summit will be held in Washington, and in 2025 in the Netherlands. According to President Zelensky, Ukraine will be able to achieve victory over Russia in 2024, which will make the issue of Ukraine joining NATO inevitable. We should hope that this year the war will take a positive turn and Ukraine's invitation to NATO will indeed become a reality at the next summit. Mon, 17 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1603 The "Community Youth Engagement in the Regions of Georgia" project has become a center of attraction for students living in the regions of Georgia and already has gathered about 1,200 young school students from the mountainous region of Adjara and the Adigeni municipality. On July 11, 2023, the winners of the quiz held within the framework of the project were selected from 20 public schools of Khulo municipality, who were given laptops, phones, tablets, and trips to the Rondeli summer camp. The goal of the project is to promote the integration of 14-18-year-old students of local public schools, raising awareness of internal and external issues, strengthening resilience, and developing practical skills through informal educational programs and activities. The Rondeli Foundation’s "Community Youth Engagement in the Regions of Georgia" project has been implemented with the financial support of the U.S. Embassy in Georgia. Fri, 14 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1602 The Rondeli Foundation continues the series of meetings in the regions on the topic: "Georgia awaiting EU candidate status: prospects and challenges." Foundation fellows Kakha Gogolashvili and Aleks Petriashvili met with the local NGOs and media in Telavi and Kutaisi. The discussion covered the history of the establishment of the EU and its importance, the challenges Georgia faces on its path to European integration, monitoring results of the fulfillment of 12 recommendations set by the European Commission, and the prospects of receiving the candidate status. The project "Strengthening Georgia’s EU Candidacy Efforts" is being implemented with the support of the Embassy of Lithuania in Georgia. The project aims to raise public awareness in this direction and to monitor the implementation of the four most problematic points of the 12-point priorities. Thu, 13 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT https://www.gfsis.org.ge/events/view/1600 Talks about the restoration of railway communication between Russia and Georgia through the occupied territory of Abkhazia have recently been heard more frequently from the Russian authorities and the media. It is interesting to explore why the issue has again become topical, who will benefit, and who will be harmed by the restoration of railway communication between Russia and Georgia, which was suspended in 1993 as a result of the war in Abkhazia. Statements from the Russian government Ministry of Foreign Affairs On June 28, during a weekly briefing, the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Maria Zakharova, answered a journalist's question on the possibility of restoring railway traffic between Russia and Armenia through the occupied territory of Abkhazia. She claimed Russia will make every effort to implement the planned large-scale "roadmap," which includes the signing of documents at the level of heads of state, and the work of relevant commissions with the participation of government representatives. Zakharova added that "everything is being done on a daily basis to implement this plan." Chamber of Commerce and Industry About six weeks before Zakharova's statement, the President of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sergey Katyrin, also talked about the transit potential of occupied Abkhazia. In an interview with Russian media on May 12, speaking about Georgian-Russian relations, he said that rail transit should be planned within the framework of the Silk Road, which covers China, Iran (Bandar Abbas, Astara), Azerbaijan (Astara, Gabala) and Georgia (Marneuli), including the territory of Abkhazia. Katyrin said he believes the opening of railway transit through Georgia would unload the Zemo Larsi border crossing and reduce the cost of cargo transportation. Shortly after Katyrin’s announcement, on May 17, Iran and Russia signed an agreement on cooperation in the construction of the Rasht-Astara Railway line. Russia plans to allocate EUR 1.3 billion for the project. Moscow expects the railway line to become part of the International North-South Transport Corridor which is to connect Russia with the countries of the Caspian region, the Persian Gulf and South Asia. If the project is implemented, Russia and Iran will be connected by a railway line through Azerbaijan. Official Stance of the Georgian Government On June 30, during his speech in Parliament, the Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Gharibashvili denied any talks with Russia on the restoration of the railway through Abkhazia, and stated that this would be possible only after the reunification of Georgia. The Speaker of the Parliament of Georgia, Shalva Papuashvili, also refuted discussion of the railway issue. Why Has the Issue Regained Relevance for Russia? The context of Russia’s statements on the restoration of railway traffic with Georgia through occupied Abkhazia is different this time. Where, previously, the project was more related to Armenia's economic interests, this time it is important to consider the fact that Russia, under pressure from the Western sanctions, is trying to develop alternative import-export routes. From February 2022, the territory and the infrastructure of Abkhazia became more attractive to Russia, which saw it as a possibility to circumvent the international sanctions. Russia’s heightened interest in Abkhazia is not limited to the railway issue alone, as it also extends to the rehabilitation of Sokhumi Airport. The rehabilitation of railway infrastructure on the territory of occupied Abkhazia, with the financial and technical support of Russia, has been going on for years; however, it is still not fully restored and has limited throughput capacity. In addition, for the implementation of Russia’s plans, even with the possible consent of Georgia, the railway line connecting the occupied territory and the territory controlled by the central government of Georgia needs complete overhaul. Obviously, the recent rehabilitation of the railway in Abkhazia with the support of Russia is dictated not only by the motive of increasing passenger traffic and developing tourism: In recent years, the scale of cargo transportation by rail in occupied Abkhazia has increased, in which Russia's interest is clearly manifested. For example, on March 23, 2023, the first container train (a total of 62 containers carrying 2,700 tons of cargo) arrived in Abkhazia. According to available information, the cargo was loaded onto a ship in the port of Ochamchire which sailed to Turkey. This very fact is an indication that Russia is trying to use every opportunity to circumvent the sanctions. Who Will Benefit and Who Will Be Harmed by the Restoration of Railway Traffic through Occupied Abkhazia? Some actors will benefit politically and economically from the restoration of rail traffic between Russia and Georgia through the territory of Abkhazia, while others will be harmed. Who Will Benefit? Russia: For Russia, against the backdrop of the war with Ukraine and consequent sanctions and confrontations with the West, any new transit corridor which would allow Moscow to offset the damage from Western sanctions is important. Although the transit resources of occupied Abkhazia (roads, railways, ports, airport) are significantly limited, the situation is so critical that all options are acceptable for the Kremlin. By restoring railway traffic through Abkhazia, Russia will get not only economic but also political benefits, which will be reflected in the growth of economic and, accordingly, political influence over Georgia. Armenia: Armenia, whose economic and transport links with its neighbors (Azerbaijan, Turkey) are still limited, has been lobbying for the renewal of railway communication on the territory of Abkhazia for years. If the railway is put into operation, Yerevan, in addition to the Zemo Larsi border crossing point and sea ports of Georgia, will develop an additional route connecting to Russia, which will help it to overcome the logistical challenges it currently faces. Occupied Abkhazia: For occupied Abkhazia, the rehabilitation of the railway infrastructure and the renewal of rail traffic will be important both economically and politically. From the economic point of view, infrastructure will be restored in Abkhazia, additional jobs will be created, and the income of the de facto government will increase as a result of the implementation of the railway corridor. From the political prospective, the occupied region will become a participant of an international project which will help to present it as an "independent" political and economic entity. Who Will Be Harmed? Georgia: Without the de-occupation of Abkhazia and the return of central government control over it, the restoration of railway connection between Russia and Georgia through occupied Abkhazia is tantamount to legitimizing the de facto government of Abkhazia and implicitly recognizing its "independence." If Georgia agrees to accept and process cargo which illegally crosses the Abkhaz section of the Russian-Georgian border without border and customs control by the relevant state institutions of Georgia, and the border and customs control of said cargo is carried out on the occupation line, it will create the risk of marking the occupation line as a state border. It should be noted that the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories explicitly states that railway and international overland traffic is restricted on the occupied territories, which means that Georgia's acceptance of Russia's proposal automatically implies making changes to the law and weakening it. In addition, against the backdrop of Russia's war with Ukraine, Georgia's participation in such a Russian economic project means assisting Moscow to circumvent the sanctions, which will lead to the strengthening of the Kremlin’s political and economic influence over Georgia by distancing the latter from the West. The West: The United States, the European Union and their allies, which have imposed sanctions on Russia, view such projects as Russia’s attempting to avoid the sanctions. At the same time, the restoration of railway communication between Russia and Georgia through occupied Abkhazia will lead to the economic strengthening of Russia in the region and the weakening of the influence of the West on the ongoing political and economic processes in Georgia. Conclusion The initiative to restore railway communication between Russia and Georgia through occupied Abkhazia is part of a far-reaching Russian plan which meets both the economic and political interests of the Kremlin: avoid Western sanctions, mitigate economic damage, ensure international legitimization of occupied Abkhazia, and strengthen its influence on Georgia. If the Georgian government agrees to Russia's proposal on the restoration of railway communication through Abkhazia and cancels the corresponding entry in the Law on Occupied Territories, the national interests of Georgia will be irreparably harmed, as Georgia will thereby be promoting the international legitimization of Russia's military occupation of its territory and the de facto government of Abkhazia. It will further ensure Georgia's return to Russia's sphere of influence, significantly damage relations with the West, and threaten the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. No economic benefit can compensate for this political damage. Therefore, in the current situation, the resumption of railway traffic between Russia and Georgia through occupied Abkhazia is not permissible. Mon, 10 Jul 2023 0:00:00 GMT